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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
The Internet breaks down barriersbetween physicaljurisdictions. When
a buyer and seller consummate a commercial transaction through a
World Wide Web site, there is no need for the traditionalphysical acts
that often determine which jurisdiction'slaw will apply and whether the
buyer or seller will be subject to personaljurisdictionin the courts where
the other is located.'

I. INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century approaches, legal scholars must anticipate
how technological and societal changes will affect our current legal doctrine. The scope of the law needs to encompass the expanding growth of
technology along with the changing needs of society. Perhaps one of the
most significant technological advancements of our time is the Internet.2
Unfortunately, legislatures have adopted few laws regulating Internet
communications.3
While expanding the speed and ease of communication, the Internet
and accompanying technology have created a myriad of situations in which
litigation might arise.4 Libel, copyright, and trademark infringement over5
the Internet have been and will continue to be popular areas for litigation.
This increase in litigation directly relates to the lack of regulations which
Internet users encounter. 6 For example, pornography over the Internet, or

'Bradley A. Slutsky, Jurisdiction Over Commerce on the Internet, (June 24, 1997)
<http://www.kslaw.com/menu/ jurisdic/html>.
2 See Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdictionand the Internet: FundamentalFairness in the
Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. LJ. SC. & TECH. 339, 341-42 (1996) (discussing

how the Internet's rapid growth will affect today's legal doctrine); William S. Byassee,
Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 199-200 (1995) (predicting new computer-related relationships
will strain current legal principles); see infra notes 8-15 (explaining the Internet).
3 See Byassee, supra note 2, at 199-200 (calling for recognition of and sensitivity to

the differences between new technology and the law); Zembek, supra note 2, at 341 (citing
public demands to know the legal boundaries of cyberspace).
4 See Zembek, supra note 2, at 341. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text
(commenting on the relationship of technology and the legal doctrine).

' Id.
6 Id. at 342-43.
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"cyberporn," has also been a topic of intense debate. 7 The Communications Decency Act of 1996,8 and the litigation that followed, have given
descriptions and definitions to new terminology. 9 This terminology is
critical to analyzing how these new areas will affect our laws.
The Internet is a world-wide network of interlinked computers. °
This vast network consists of millions of host computers that provide information and services to consumers." Host computers that provide Internet services, also called web sites, 12 each have a unique Internet address
just as each home has a unique mailing address.' 3 These web sites allow
users to exchange digital information such as electronic mail (e-mail),
computer programs, images, or music.' 4 The collection of web sites available over the Internet is known as the World Wide Web,' 5 and each gite is
accessed by an individual user with the
help of a computer, a modem, and
16
software.
access
Internet
of
some type
Given the accessibility of the Internet by people all over the world, it
is not difficult to forsee the potential jurisdictional issues that might arise
in the event of litigation. The most fundamental area to be explored is the
issue of personal jurisdiction.' 7 Personal jurisdiction, as it relates to Internet communications, is a particular area of law that is currently under
scrutiny by the courts. 8 New technological advances via the Internet have

7 See Byassee, supra note 2, at 203-11 (discussing pornography on the Internet).
8 47 U.S.C. § 223 (West 1997).

9 See generally Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (1996) (interpreting new restraints on
Internet communication and defining vital terms). See also MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F.
Supp. 202, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (defining the Internet, host computers, e-mail, and
computer bulletin boards); Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, Time
Magazine, July 25, 1994, at 50.
10MTV Networks, 867 F. Supp. at 204 & n. 1.
1 Id.
12Id. at 204 & n.2.
13Id.
14 Id.
15Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(quoting Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (1996)).
16 See generally Zembek, supra note 2 (explaining Internet access).
17 See Byassee, supra note 2, at 199 (describing jurisdictional questions as the most
difficult to reconcile through modern legal doctrine); Zembek, supra note 2, at 341 (stating
that the "most fundamental issue of personal jurisdiction is being ignored").
18See generally Byassee, supra note 2 (discussing personal jurisdiction over the
Internet); Zembek, supra note 2 (stating that jurisdictional issues in cyberspace need to be
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created legal uncertainty. 9 Current legal precedent and accompanying
doctrine may well address some of the potential problems, but many other
sources of litigation remain unclear.20

II.

HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A court may exercise power over a particular defendant if the the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. 2' Limits on a court's ability to
exercise personal jurisdiction arise from two sources, the United States
Constitution and state long-arm statutes.22 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution permits state
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only
if sufficient "minimum contacts" exist with the forum state.23 The party
seeking personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant must first
show that the out-of-state defendant's actions fell within the parameters of
the state's long-arm statute and meet the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24
States' long-arm statutes vary, 25 some states have long-arm statutes
which allow their courts to exercise jurisdictional power to the full extent
allowed under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 26 Other states
have statutory restrictions that specify enumerated situations when courts
may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. 27 Some

further explored).
19 See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 9, at 50 (detailing new issues and conflicts that have
arisen with the growth of the Internet).
20 See Byassee, supra note 2, at 199-200 (calling for recognition of the differences,
not arguing the inadequacies). But see Zembek, supra note 2, at 345 (stating that many
"cyber-actions" cannot be categorized under current law).
21

See generally JOSEPH GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS,

23-28 (3d ed. 1997) (explaining jurisdiction).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (Law. Co-op.
1996); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (Consol. 1996).
23 GLANNON, supra note 21, at 4. See Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945) (ruling that the maintenance of suit does not offend the notions of fair play and
substantial justice).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 223A, § 3 (Law. Co-op.
1996); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (Consol. 1996).
25 See GLANNON, supra note 21, at 23-28 (discussing state long-arm statutes).
26 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1996).
27 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 223A, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302
(Consol. 1996); 110 ILL. REV. STAT. 2-209 (1996).
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limits are placed on the particular cause
of action, while other limits are
28
defendant.
the
of
activities
the
on
based
The Supreme Court expounded upon state court's jurisdiction with the
landmark decision in InternationalShoe v. Washington.29 This case overruled the "presence" standard and allowed jurisdiction over any party with
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state. 30 The decision explained that the maintenance of the suit in the forum state shall be allowed
only "according to our traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial
justice.",3' In this case, the Supreme Court adopted the current two-prong
32
approach to personal jurisdiction: minimum contacts and reasonableness.
In order for the out-of-state defendant to be subject to suit, minimum
contacts must be found between the defendant and the forum state. 33 If
these contacts to the forum state are found to be continuous and systematic,
the state courts would have "general jurisdiction" over the defendant.3 4
When general jurisdiction exists, the court will have a sufficient basis for
exercising jurisdiction for any cause of action against the defendant. 35 If
the court decides contacts are less than continuous and systematic, a court
may only exercise jurisdiction if the action arose against the out-of-state
36
defendant from the particular contact of that defendant with the state.
Courts refer to this concept as "specific jurisdiction" and grant it in cases
involving such isolated
acts as a breach of contract 37 or the settlement of a
38
policy.
life insurance
§ 3 (Law. Co-op. 1996).

28

MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 223A,

29

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

30

See International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (ruling that a state may not make

binding judgments on an individual lacking contacts with that state). But see Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (deciding that personal service and notice are key
elements of personal jurisdiction).
31 InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
32 See id. at 319-20 (requiring minimum contacts and reasonableness).
33See id. at 310 (elaborating on the notion of minimum contacts). See also infra note

87 (expaining the doctrine of minimum contacts).
34See generally Helecopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 461 U.S. 955 (1984)
(holding that casual contacts are not enough to find general jurisdiction). See GLANNON
supra note 20, at 12 (defining continuous and systematic contact).
35See Perkins v. Benguet, 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (deciding that when activities are
sufficiently continuous, due process allows the exercise of jurisdiction).
36 See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448-49 (ruling that, if general jurisdiction is found, then
the issue need not arise from the contacts). See generally Helecopteros, 461 U.S. 955.
37See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (finding
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In order for a court to subject a non-resident defendant to a lawsuit, in
addition to minimum contacts, the court must find that the defendant purposely availed himself of the benefits and protection of the laws of the
state. 39 This doctrine dictates that a party is subject to personal jurisdiction if he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that state.40
The Supreme Court has held that a nationally published magazine could
reasonably foresee being haled into court for libel actions in any state
where the magazine is sold. 4 ' The Court, however, did not find jurisdiction over an automobile dealer for selling a car involved in an accident in
another state. 42
Even when a court finds minimum contacts, a defendant may still defeat a finding of personal jurisdiction if he can prove that it would be unfair for the court to exercise jurisdiction. 3 The court will base this test on
the interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the forum state. 44 For example, in 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that in a business relationship the
burden is on the defendant to prove that it is unreasonable for him to defend himself in the forum state.4 5 The Supreme Court, however, is split on
jurisdiction over the defendant based on the purposeful making of a contract).
38 See generally McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 385 U.S. 220 (1957) (finding
specific jurisdiction based on a life insurance policy entered into in the forum state).
39 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958) (quoting InternationalShoe,
326 U.S. at 319) (stating that the defendant must "purposely avail itself of the privilege of
acting within the state").
40 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253-54 (requiring purposeful availment before granting
jurisdiction). See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 792 (1984) (determining that
jurisdiction is proper when intentional tortious acts are directed into the forum state);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984) (holding that circulating magazines
in the forum state constitutes adequate minimum contacts). But see World Side Volkswagen
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citing knowledge that a car driven into the forum
state is not purposeful availment).
41 See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (ruling that actions intentionally directed to the forum
state satisfy minimum contacts); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 (finding jurisdiction over the
defendant who "continuously and deliberately exploited" the market of the forum state).
42 See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286 (deciding that mere foreseeability
does not satisfy the requirement of purposeful availment).
43 See generally GLANNON, supra note 21, at 5-8 (discussing the reasonableness
requirement).
44 See generally Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985) (ruling that
the defendant should reasonably anticipate being sued in Florida based on a contractual
relationship).
45 Id. at 473-74.
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the personal jurisdiction of a defendant who sells goods that are not directed to46the forum state but may wind up there through a "stream of commerce."'
III. INTERNET AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION: CASE LAW
In recent years, courts have dealt with issues of personal jurisdiction
in cases involving the Internet. Although the facts of these cases have
varied, they have all had one characteristic in common: the judges have
employed restraint in expanding the concept of personal jurisdiction. 47
In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,48 the Florida
Court of Appeal grappled with the issue of jurisdiction involving a computerized airline reservation system. 49 The issue raised was whether the
non-resident defendant travel agent had sufficient minimum contacts to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida. 50 After plaintiff failed to repair
the reservation system, the defendant stopped payment under the contract
for the use of the system. 5' The plaintiff sued for breach of contract in
Florida and the defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction.5 2 The trial court denied the defendant's motion.53
On appeal, the court decided that the appropriate test for determining
whether personal jurisdiction exists was whether the defendant could
"reasonably anticipate being hailed into a Florida court. ' 54 They determined the only contacts between the defendant and Florida were rental
payments made to the plaintiff in Miami and right of entry to a computer

46 Compare Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105-16 (1987)
(finding no substantial connection between the defendant's actions and the forum state),
with Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that the
defendant did purposely avail itself of California laws).
47 See infra notes 49-127.
48 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).
49 Id. at 1351-52.
50 Id. See generally International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (setting
the "minimum contacts" standard).
51Pres-Kap, Inc., 636 So.2d at 1352. The defendant complained to the plaintiff's
New York office, but the defendant claimed that nothing was repaired. Id. In March 1991,
the defendant ceased payments on the leased computer terminals and in July the terminals
were removed by the plaintiff. Id.
52 Id. Plaintiff sued for breach of the lease agreement. Id.
53 Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc, 636 So. 2d 1351, 1352 (Fla. Ct.

App. 1994).
54 Id. (citing World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286).
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database owned by the defendant accessed via computer terminals.5 5 The
court dismissed the plaintiff's argument that the existence of a contract
with a Florida citizen was sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts standard. 56 The court found no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge as to the location of the computer database, and, even if the defendant
had such knowledge, it would not create a reasonable expectation of suit in
Florida.57 The court took issue with the source of the defendant's financial
gain which arose "from a New York, not a Florida based transaction. 58
For these reasons, the appeals court overturned the trial court's denial of
the defendant's motion to dismiss. 9
The appeals court's decision focused on the possible implications of a
contrary decision. 6° The court stated that to uphold the trial court's decision would result in subjecting the user of any on-line service to suit in the
state where the "supplier's billing office or database happened to be located., 61 The court went on to hold that the exercise of jurisdiction goes
far beyond any consumer's reasonable expectations and would certainly
violate the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 62
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Barkdull argued that, by accessing the
computer database in Florida, the defendant purposefully availed itself of
the information contained therein. 63 This situation dictates that the defen-

5'Id. at 1353.
56

Id. The court stated that the contract cannot convert this "obviously New York-

based transaction into a Florida transaction" in order to show that the defendant could have
reasonably anticipated defending a suit in Florida. Id.
57Id.
58Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc, 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1994).
59Id.
60 Id. See also Michael J. Santisi, Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.:
Extending the Reach of the Long-Arm Statute Through the Internet?, 13 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER

&

INFO.

L. 433, 441-51 (1995) (arguing against the rationale used in the Pres-

Kap case).
61 Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353.
62 Id. See generally Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (explaining the
"fairness" test for minimum contacts); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) (deciding the minimum contacts test); Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d
499 (Fla. 1989) (applying minimum contacts test).
63 See Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc, 636 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1994) (Barkdull, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the defendant's actions
constituted purposeful availment).
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dant could reasonably expect to be haled into a Florida court. 64 The dissenting judge felt that the court should exercise jurisdiction over the defendant since the information
in Florida contributed to the financial gain of
65
his New York company.
Perhaps the first case to deal with contacts to the forum state via the
internet was CompuServe v. Patterson.66 This Sixth Circuit case involved
a dispute between an Internet access provider and one of its software distributors.67 The plaintiff sought to prove that the defendant's conduct with
the forum state was substantial68 enough for the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
CompuServe is a computer information service with headquarters in
Columbus, Ohio. 69 Although all of CompuServe's facilities are located in
Ohio, subscribers may access its services from any computer terminal in
the world.70 Consumers pay a monthly fee to gain access to computing
and information services via the Internet, as well as software that CompuServe or third parties have provided. 7 ' Parties who choose to distribute
"shareware" must enter into a contract to do business with CompuServe.72
This basic contract, called a "Shareware Registration Agreement, 73 allows CompuServe to furnish its subscribers with the software that the
shareware providers create.74 The agreement, which a subscriber enters
into electronically, stipulates that the parties formed the contract in Ohio
and that it shall "be governed by and construed in accordance with" Ohio
law.75

64

Id.

65 Id.

See also Santisi, supra note 59, at 441 (discussing the Pres-Kapdissent).

66 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
67 Id. at 1258-59 (detailing appeal of granted motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction).
68 See id. at 1259 (determining if minimum contacts exist enough to exercise personal
jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant); see generally InternationalShoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) (deciding the minimum contacts test).
69 CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1258 (6th Cir. 1996).
70 id.
71Id. at 1258-59.
72 Id. at 1259.
71 Id. at 1260. This Shareware Registration Agreement incorporates the CompuServe
Service Agreement and the Rules of Operation. Id.
74 CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1259 (6th Cir. 1996).
" Id. at 1261.
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The defendant Patterson began to electronically submit software files
to CompuServe in 1991.76 Patterson created software to aid in the navigation of the Internet. 7 Soon after Patterson began to market his product,
CompuServe developed a similar product. 78 Patterson notified CompuServe that its marketing of its products infringed on his company's common
law copyrights and that CompuServe's actions constituted deceptive trade
practices. 79 CompuServe then filed a declaratory judgment action in the
federal district court in the Southern District of Ohio denying any wrongdoing. 8° Patterson responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 8'
Patterson argued that the Ohio court had no jurisdiction over him because he had never entered Ohio.82 Patterson stated that his contacts were
merely via a computer hookup and were not sufficient to warrant a finding
of personal jurisdiction.83 The district court agreed with Patterson's arguments and dismissed the case.84 CompuServe appealed this ruling to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 85
Noting that this was a case of first impression, the appeals court thoroughly examined the history of personal jurisdiction in this matter. 86 The
court sought to answer the question: "Did CompuServe make a prima facie
showing that Patterson's contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient under the Due Process Clause, to
support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him?"87

76

id.

'7Id.
78 Id.

at 1261-62.
at 1262.

79CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1258 (6th Cir. 1996). Patterson claimed
that the terms "WinNAV," "Windows Navigator," and "FlashPoint Windows Navigator"
were all trademarks that CompuServe was using without permission. Id. CompuServe
changed the name of its program, but Patterson continued to demand $100,000 to settle his

potential claims. Id.
8o Id. at 1261 (asserting that CompuServe neither infringed on any copyrights nor
engaged in any deceptive acts).
81 Id.

82 Id. at 1261-63.
83 Id. at 1262.
84

CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining how the

district court dismissed the claims made by CompuServe).
85 Id.

86
8

Id. at 1265-69.
Id. at 1262.
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The court responded by analyzing the different constitutional aspects of
personal jurisdiction. 88 The court found that CompuServe had succeeded
in proving the first two prongs of the jurisdiction test. First, the court
found that Patterson had availed himself of the privilege of acting in the
forum state.89 Second, his contacts with Ohio were related to the facts of
the controversy and,
therefore, the burden shifted to the defendant to disprove jurisdiction. 90
9
The appeals court gave a lengthy discussion of the fairness test. '
The court considered a number of factors: 1) the burden on the defendant;
2) the interest of the plaintiff in obtaining relief; 3) the interest of the forum state; and 4) the interests of other states in resolving such disputes.92
The appeals court reversed the trial court's ruling based on the issue of
fairness. 93 The appeals court determined that although it may be burdensome for Patterson to defend the suit in Ohio, he was put on notice that he
was "making a connection with Ohio" when he entered into the agreement
with CompuServe. 94 The court acknowledged Ohio's interest in resolving
this dispute involving an Ohio company and Ohio copyright law. 95 The
appeals court found a sufficient connection between Patterson and CompuServe for Ohio to assert jurisdiction over the defendant. 96 The appeals
court stated that someone "who employs a computer network service like

88 Id.

at 1263-68. The court analyzed three aspects necessary to satisfy constitutional

requirements for a finding of minimum contacts in order to exercise personal jurisdiction:
the "purposeful availment" requirement; the requirement that the cause of action arises from
Patterson's activities in Ohio; and the "reasonableness" requirement. Id.
89 CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Patterson was the "purchaser" of services and no doubt purposefully transacted business in
Ohio).
90Id. at 1267-68. The court stated that Patterson could have marketed and sold his
products elsewhere with similar results, yet he only sold his software to CompuServe in
Ohio. Id. at 1284. Any kind of copyright infringement must have occurred in Ohio. Id. at
1285. The court also stated that Patterson's threats to seek an injunction against
CompuServe, which gave rise to the present case, were indeed contacts made in Ohio. Id.
91Id. at 1268 (discussing the reasonableness requirement).
92 Id. (citing American Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (6th Cir.
1988)); see also supranotes 30-33 (discussing reasonableness requirement).
9'Id. at 1268.
94 CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996).
9'Id. at 1268.
96
1d.
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CompuServe to market a product can reasonably expect disputes with that
service to yield lawsuits in the service's home state. 9 7
As important as the holding of the case is to the future of personal
jurisdiction, the dicta contained within the court's decision is equally engaging. The court enumerated certain aspects of this area of law that the
decision did not cover. 98 It made no decision as to whether Patterson
could be subject to personal jurisdiction in any state where his software
was purchased or used. 99 The opinion also did not discuss whether CompuServe would have jurisdiction to sue any subscriber to its service for
non-payment in Ohio. t°°
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit in Bensusan RestaurantCorporation v. King' ° ' has also addressed and answered specific questions
that deal with personal jurisdiction via the internet. ° 2 The parties, both of
whom engaged in the entertainment business, each operated a nightclub
under the name, "The Blue Note.' ' ° 3 The defendant posted a web site to
advertise his club in Columbia, Missouri.' °4 To prevent confusion, this
web site mentioned the plaintiff's club in New York.'0 5 The plaintiff
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York claiming trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
trademark dilution.1 6 The defendant answered with a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 0 7 In deciding the motion to dismiss, the

97
98

id.
Id. at 1268.

99 See CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996). See also World
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (discussing reasonableness requirement

of subjecting an out-of-state defendant to personal jurisdiction).
'0o Id. at 1289.
'0' 937 F. Supp. 295 (1996).
102 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(affirming a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by the defendant).
103 Id. at 297.
104

id.

105

Id. at 297-98. King's web site contained a disclaimer that his club is "not to be

confused" with The Blue Note of New York City. Id. The disclaimer also had a
"hyperlink" that allowed the Internet user to directly connect to the plaintiff's web site. Id.
106 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The
plaintiff brought the action only after notifying King. Id. King altered his web site but the
changes were not satisfactory for Bensusan. Id.
107 Id. at 298; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (defining motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction).

104

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. I

court relied on the factual allegations made in the plaintiff's complaint and
the two applicable prongs of New York long-arm statute. 10 8 The court
analyzed each prong separately.'09
In analyzing the first prong, the court focused on the idea that a New

York court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant "who commits a tortious act within the state" as long as the cause of
the action asserted arises from the tortious act. 1 ° Courts have interpreted
this statute as stating that the act of offering to sell a product can support
the exercise of jurisdiction."1 The issue remained, however, as to whether
the creation of a web site is an offer to sell a product in New York.' 12 The
district court found that it could not properly exercise jurisdiction under
this statute over the Missouri resident because it takes "several affirmative
' 13
steps by the New York resident ... to obtain access to the web site."
The court further acknowledged that the mere fact that a person can illicit4
information on a product does not amount to advertising in New York."
The decision stated that no court could exercise jurisdiction in the absence
of an activity directed at the people of New York, per C.P.L.R. §
302(a)(2)."'

log
Bensusan,

937 F. Supp. at 298-99. If a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction, they will defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
109 Id.
110 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See Pilates Inc. v. Pilates Inst. Inc., 891 F. Supp. 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (interpreting
C.P.L.R. §302(a)(1), part of New York's long-arm statute).
1 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299. See, e.g., Editorial Musical Latino Americana,
S.A. v. Mar Int'l Records, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 62, 64-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a
single sale may support jurisdiction); German Educ. Television Network, Ltd. v. Oregon
Pub. Broad. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that the act of selling
products could subject defendant to personal jurisdiction); Hertz Sys., Inc. v. Hervis Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 796, 797-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (interpreting statute to find jurisdiction over
defendant based on an offer to sell).
112 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299.
113 Id. The court stated that a New York resident must access the Internet using their
computer, then telephone the box office in Missouri to order tickets, and finally pick up the
tickets in Missouri since King will not send the tickets to the buyer. Id. This, the court
adds, should clear up any confusion about where the club is located, however even if the
buyer is still confused, any type of infringement would have to occur in Missouri. Id.
"4 Id. at 299.
11 See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
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Next, the court interpreted the second prong of the long-arm statute to
allow the court to exercise jurisdiction over any non resident who "expects
or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and
16
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." 1
The plaintiff sought to show that the defendant participated in interstate
commerce; however, the statute explicitly states that substantial revenue
must be obtained from interstate commerce." 7 The plaintiff argued that it
was foreseeable to the defendant that he may be sued in New York because
the plaintiff's club is located there." 8 The court felt that this argument did
not sufficiently satisfy an expectation of consequences in New York; specifically, no discernible effort was made to serve a market in New York. ' 9
The court's two pronged analysis and the insufficiency of the plaintiff's
argument led the court to conclude that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 20
The court then addressed a constitutional Due Process issue when it
sought to determine whether an assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
would offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 121 The court decided that by creating a web site, the defendant had
not purposely availed himself of benefits in New York.' 22 As a result, the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant should have foreseen that users
could access the site in New York was insufficient to satisfy Due Process. 123
The Bensusan decision also distinguished its facts from the CompuServe case.124 In CompuServe, the defendant specifically targeted the forum

116

Id. at 300.

'7Id.
11sId.

19 Id. (finding that King's knowledge that Bensusan's club was located in New York
is insufficient).
120 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
121See id. at 300-01 (analyzing the Due Process aspect of personal jurisdiction); see
generally Darby v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 769 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
122 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301. This is equivalent to placing a product into the
stream of commerce, which the United States Supreme Court has interpreted to be not
purposely directed toward the forum state. Id. at 301. See generally Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
123 Id. See also generally Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1986); Beckett v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 893 F. Supp. 234, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
124 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (discussing CompuServe case).
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state by subscribing to the service and entering into a contract with the
plaintiff.' 2 The defendant also advertised his software over the Internet
via CompuServe. 26 The court concluded that the defendant "reached out"
into the forum state. 27 In the present case, the court recognized
that the
28
defendant could not have directed any contact into New York.'
IV. MASSACHUSETTS

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided an Internet trademark infringment case when it found a California
129
corporation subject to personal jurisdiction in the Massachusetts courts.
In Digital Equipment Corporation v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,' 30 the
plaintiff, Digital Equipment Corporation, ("Digital") purchased the right to
the name "AltaVista" from the defendant, AltaVista Technology, Inc.
("ATI").'' Digital then licensed back to ATI the right to use "AltaVista"
in certain enumerated ways. 32 In the court action, Digital sought a preliminary injunction claiming that ATI breached 33
the licensing agreement by
improperly using "AltaVista" on their web site.'
Discussion of this case should begin with insight on Massachusetts'
long-arm statute.' 34 The First Circuit has consistently held that it must

125

Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see

also supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the Compuserve case).
126 Id. at 301.
See also supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing the
rationale used in Compuserve).
127 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301. See also supra notes 93-104 and accompanying
text (detailing Compuserve).
128 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
129 See generally Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D.
Mass. 1997) (asserting jurisdiction based on contacts via the Internet).
130 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
131Id. at 459.
132 Id.
133id.
134

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1996). The exercise of personal

jurisdiction over a non-resident is governed by the Massachusetts long-arm statute and its
corresponding precedent. Id. The Massachusetts long-arm statute says in relevant part: "A
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as
to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's (a) transaction any business
in the commonwealth .. .(d) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or
omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly ...derives substantial revenue from the
...services rendered, in this commonwealth. Id.
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1 35
first look to state law when deciding whether jurisdiction is appropriate.
Even though the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the
statute to allow the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent of the United
States Constitution, this constitutional analysis will reach only "when some
' 36
basis for jurisdiction enumerated in the statute has been established.'
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing facts to support a finding of
jurisdiction under the statute and37 to establish minimum contacts sufficient
to satisfy Due Process analysis.

ATI argued that the court in Massachusetts had no personal jurisdiction over it as a California corporation. 38 Although ATI admitted that the
litigation arose from a contract with a Massachusetts corporation, the com39
pany felt that a contract alone should not satisfy minimum contacts.
The court concluded that (1) ATI entered into a contract interpreted "under
and accordance" with the laws of Massachusetts, (2) breach of this contract gave rise to the litigation, (3) ATI operated a web site accessable to
users in Massachusetts, (4) ATI solicited its software products on the web
site, (5) the company sold its software products to at least three Massachusetts residents, and (6) the trademark
infringement has "caused consider'4
able confusion in Massachusetts." 0
The court analyzed these factual findings in conjunction with three
sections of the Massachusetts long-arm statute: ATI's transacting business
in Massachusetts, ATI's allegedly causing tortious injury in Massachusetts
via its web-site, and ATI's engaging in a persistent course of conduct in

135 See generally Caso v. LaFayette, 370 F.2d. 707 (1st. Cir. 1966) (quoting Pulson v.

American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (lst Cir. 1948)). See also Gray v. O'Brien, 777
F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Hahn v. Vermont Law School, 698 F.2d 48, 49-50 (lst
Cir. 1983)). But see Caso 370 F.2d at 709 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356
U.S. 525 (1958) and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)) (resolving choice of law
issues).
136 Gray, 777 F.2d at 866. See also Morrill v. Tong, 390 Mass. 120, 128, 453 N.E.2d
1221, 1227 (1983); Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 4-7, 389
N.E.2d 76, 79-80 (1980).
137 Morrill, 390 Mass. at 129, 453 N.E.2d at 1227 (quoting Good Hope, 378 Mass. at
6, 389 N.E.2d at 79-80). MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 223A, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1996). See
generally World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286.
138 Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 460-62 (D. Mass.
1997).
139

id. at 462.

'4

Id. at 462-64.
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4
Massachusetts by maintaining a web-site outside of Masaschusetts.1 1
ATI's actions coupled with the presence of a contract with Digital
prompted the court to find that the "contract with the plaintiff was one part
of a broader range of activities that, literally, amounted to the transaction
of business in Massachusetts," satisfying Section 3(a) of the long-arm
statute.1 42 By making misrepresentations in Massachusetts via the Internet, the court found Section 3(c) of the statute to be satisfied because the
lawsuit "arises from" ATI's allegedly tortious acts.' 43 The court also determined that a web-site that can be accessed by Massachusetts residents is
persistent enough course of action to meet the requirements of Section
3(d).' 44 In determining that ATI's activities, which gave rise to the underlying claims, occurred in Massachusetts, the court held that ATI's activities satisfied the Due Process analysis of personal jurisdiction. 45

The court found that the second and third prong of the personal jurisdiction test were satisfied.' 46 The court found that ATI knew Digital was
located in Massachusetts and therefore any act that would have a harmful
effect on Digital and the citizens of Massachusetts satisfied the purposful
availment prong.147 Next, the court analyzed the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant.' 48 The court applied the
test to the facts of the present case and found that all factors point to "the
Court's assertion of jurisdiction over ATI."' 49 This decision seems to

141 See

Digital,960 F. Supp. 456, 464-68 (comparing M.G.L. 223A, § 3 (a, c-d) to the

facts of the case). The court found facts which satisfy the respective parts of the
Massachusetts long-arm statute. Id. at 464.
142 Id. at 465-66 (quoting Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 769, 625 N.E.2d
549, 552-53 (1994)) (commenting on MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 223A, § 3(a)).
143Id. at 466-67 (discussing § 3(c) of the Massachusetts Long-arm statute).
144 Id. at
145

467 (explaining § 3(d) of the Massachusetts Long-arm statute).
Id. at 468 (summarizing the first prong of the personal jurisdiction test).

146 Digital

Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 470-71 (D. Mass.

1997).
"'v Id. at 470.
148 See id. at 470-72

jurisdiction).
149Id. at 471.

(focusing on the reasonalbleness of exercising personal

The court used a five factor test to determine reasonableness and

fairness in asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 470. These factors being: the burden of appearance
of the defendant; the interest in the forum state in ajudicating the claim; the convenience of
the particular venue; the administration of justice; and relevant policy arguments. Id. at
470-71.
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agree with
most of the jursidictions that have adjudicated this very same
issueO5°

V. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's handling of the issue of personal
jurisdiction of non-resident defendants has changed and evolved throughout the last century. This evolution has been a result of changes in technology and the modernization of legal thought. The four cases detailed in
this article represent only the infancy of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction via the Internet. As the Supreme Court has altered its stance on personal jurisdiction throughout the years, one can only assume that the same
will be true with respect to cases involving the Internet. This article is in
no way exhaustive as the legal tides seem to change daily. It is only an
effort to demonstrate how the state and federal courts will try to take Supreme Court precedent and adapt it to new modern areas of law.
Michael MacClary

150 Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 472 (D. Mass.
1997). See also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 622-23 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (finding reasonableness enough to satisfy the Burger King standard); EDIAS
Software Int'l v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 419-20 (D. Ariz. 1996) (holding facts
lead to appropriate exercise of jurisdiction by the court).

